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Donald MacKenzie
Just after 11.:00 a.m. every weekday that is not a bank holiday, a calculation is performed at a couple of desks in an unremarkable open-plan office in London’s Docklands. Small sets of numbers arrive electronically or – in 2006, when I witnessed the process – by telephone. Discrepancies amongst them are highlighted by error-detection software, and they are also inspected for numbers that simply ‘look wrong’. Obvious typing mistakes are corrected. Less clear-cut discrepancies are checked by a telephone call: ‘Hello, it’s [X]. Just want to check the one-week on the Danish [kKrone]. You guys are quoting 2.51. You want to keep it around that?’ or ‘Everyone else is coming in a good bit under that.’. Sometimes those who should have provided inputs are telephoned and reminded.
Once half the necessary inputs are in, a simple computerized algorithm begins to be applied. After all inputs have been received and checked, the final results of the algorithm are disseminated via electronic networks. This normally happens by 11.:30 a.m., though when I was watching it was 11:.43 before one of the two staff members involved said to his colleague: ‘Yyou can publish away.’. (It was a Friday, a day on which more reminders seem to be necessary.)
This undramatic process could be have been mistaken for the aggregation of sales figures from small shops or the compilation of a sports league table. It is was in fact the calculation of British Bankers’ Association (BBA) LIBOR, London Interbank Offered Rate: the average interest rate at which major banks can borrow funds from others in the interbank market in a particular currency for a given period. Because, at the time of writingin 2006, BBA LIBOR covereds ten10 currencies and 15 time periods (from overnight to a year), a day’s LIBOR wais actually 150 rates.
Although its process of calculation wais not dramatic, and the scandal surrounding it had yet to erupt, LIBOR’s importance couldcan be seen even in 2006 in the arrangements if terrorism or other disruption stoppeds it being done in the office in which I witnessed it. A nearby, similarly -equipped office building wais kept in readiness; dedicated lines hadve been laid into the homes of those responsible for the BBA LIBOR calculation; there wais a permanently -staffed back-up site, over 150 miles away, which couldan also calculate LIBOR.
BBA LIBOR matters because it is the dominant interest-rate benchmark. Calculated in London, LIBOR rates are used globally, for example in financial derivatives: contracts or securities whosethe value of which depends upon the price of an underlying asset or the level of an index or interest rate (most commonly LIBOR). Data collected by the Bank for International Settlements suggest that derivatives indexed to LIBOR probably total around $44350 trillion, the equivalent of about over $650,000 for every human being on earth.
In 2006, LIBOR hads neverr, to my knowledge, been the object of a social-science study; for example, work in economics commonly useds LIBOR as an input, but as far as I am aware no economist hads studied how it is produced. My sources are were observation of the BBA LIBOR calculation; interviews with eight people involved in LIBOR (four with its overall design and management or with the calculation itself; four who makemade, or had recently made, banks’ LIBOR inputs); and documents and seminar materials produced by the British Bankers’ Association.
Several aspects of LIBOR are of interest. First, BBA LIBOR wais part of a gift economy. The banks that madke the inputs weare not paid; the electronic networks that disseminated LIBOR paidy only a small fee; those who use LIBOR to draw up derivatives contracts do so free -of -charge. (Of course, as all social scientists know, gifts are not arbitrary generosity: for example, being part of a LIBOR Contributor Panel used to beis a sign of a bank’s standing.) Second, LIBOR shows that it is easy to overstate the death of geography or the flatness of the world.​[2]​ LIBOR wais a global fact, and its production involveds many international banks (membership of the British Bankers’ Association is open to all banks operating in Britain), but it wais also recognizably London Interbank Offered Rate. Why that wais so—why the benchmark wais not, for example, a set of New York rates—wais an outcome deeply interwoven with the commercial, cultural, and regulatory history of London. One interviewee even suggested that when the BBA’s official interest-rate ‘fixing’ began in 1985 (before London’s leisurely ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ had succumbed fully to the early mornings of Americanization), 11.:00 am was chosen because only by then could one be certain that ‘everybody was up and running’.
The most fascinating aspect of BBA LIBOR, however, wais that it wais a set of facts: until recently2008, there was remarkably little dispute about it. A BBA LIBOR input wais the rate at which the inputting bank ‘could borrow funds [“unsecured”, and “governed by the laws of England and Wales”] were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 11.:00’ in the currency and for the time period in question.​[3]​ What constitutes ‘just prior’ or ‘reasonable market size’ wais not defined, and the verb form wais conditional: ‘could borrow . . . were it to do so’. There wais no requirement that money actually be borrowed.
The dealers who madke LIBOR inputs seemed most often to do so by adding small experience-based ‘spreads’ (which are single-digit numbers of basis points: i.e. hundredths of percentage points) to the figures on inter-dealer brokers’ screens. One dealer explained:
[W]. . . within, say, the pool of 16 [banks on a LIBOR pPanel] . . . you’ll probably have three aggressive lenders, so the run-through you get from the broker is where you’ve going to get the first three lots of money. After that you have to move your price up until it becomes attractive enough for the people that don’t want to lend to suddenly think, ‘Wwell, this is becoming attractive enough to do it,’, and that’s where this spread . . . comes from. . . . [I]t’s not going to be a mid-market rate, it’s going to be the point at which you are likely to get the money.
Those who madke BBA LIBOR inputs (and no doubt many of those who used LIBOR) weare well aware that enormous sums of money hinge on its precise level, sometimes for the particular banks making inputs—an evident source of temptation to manipulate it. However, the core of the ‘sociotechnical design’ of LIBOR wais interlinked mechanisms designed to protect its status as a set of facts. Most important wais the LIBOR algorithm, which wais not a simple average. Inputs for each currency and time period are rank-ordered, the top and bottom quartiles are ignored, and the mean of the remainder is calculated: that mean is LIBOR. So no single bank couldan move LIBOR by a wildly high or low input, and it seemed as if the interests of larger groups of banks will would vary and under normal circumstances weare unlikely to be stable: the same bank will benefit at some times from a higher rate, at other times from a lower.
A single well-chosen input might still move LIBOR marginally, but when making an input a dealer cannot could not w see what other banks have done. (The screens employed to make electronic inputs were not originally private, giving rise to the possibility of choosing an input in the light of what others have done.) Furthermore, once a day’s LIBOR rates wereare set, each input—and the name of the bank that has made it—wais also disseminated electronically, and thus wais open to sceptical scrutiny: one interviewee showed me that day’s inputs into three-month sterling LIBOR, pointing with suspicion to a bank that had reduced its input—by a single basis point—from the previous day’s, while all others had either increased theirs or left them unchanged. 
Finally, an advisory panel to the BBA selects the members of Contributor Panels, and a bank that regularly made dubious inputs could face embarrassing removal. This sanction, one interviewee told me, has been used, albeit not recently.
BBA LIBOR wais of course a social-kind,​[4]​ performative fact: it wais the output of the process of calculation described above. Nevertheless, market participants have also generally regarded it as a faithful representation, adequately reflecting conditions in the interbank market. The credit crisis did, however, spark controversy over LIBOR, especially in spring 2008. Critics suggested that rates were being biased downwards because banks feared that reporting that they could borrow only at high rates would spark rumours about their creditworthiness, and central bankers reportedly began to worry that doubts about LIBOR were further unsettling already febrile money markets. Much of the controversy focused on US dollar LIBOR, with some in the USA apparently unhappy that the benchmark dollar rates were being set in London at a time when traders in the USA were only starting to arrive at their desks. However, a potential rival as an interest-rate benchmark, New York Funding Rate, created by brokers Wrightson ICAP in June 2008, actually tended to differ only slightly from LIBOR. The British Bankers’ Association created a new subcommittee to vet inputs, which hads the power to ask any bank making dubious inputs to justify them, and by late 2008 the controversy seemed to have passed. However, it suddenly returned to the news in March 2011 when it became known that four banks had received subpoenas from regulators investigating inputs in 2006–-8 to the calculation of US dollar LIBOR. At the time of writing, the outcome of this investigation was not known: it may lead nowhere, but it also has the potential to destabilize this crucial set of global facts.
Update, March November 2013
The outcome of the investigation is now largely known. It has revealed large-scale efforts to manipulate LIBOR, and at the time of writing, four three banks—Barclays, UBS, and the Royal Bank of Scotland, and Rabobank—have so far settled with the authorities and received large fines. Crucially, it seems that in some cases efforts to manipulate LIBOR involved coordinated inputs by traders in several different banks, and brokers—the rates on whose screens are, as noted, important information drawn on by those making LIBOR inputs—were also drawn into the manipulation. These two features meant that the elimination in the LIBOR algorithm of the highest and lowest inputs did not always may not have prevented successful manipulation by ad hoc coalitions of traders in multiple banks and brokers keen for brokerage fees. Both civil actions and criminal investigations are under way, and LIBOR’s credibility has indeed been undermined: it is still global, but no longer simply a fact..
Yet LIBOR itself remains, although it hais beening slimmed down to five currencies (US dollars, euros, yen, Swiss francs, and sterling) and fewer ‘tenors’ (time periods). Iits administration has been taken over by the NYSE Euronext group, (which operates  the London International Financial Futures Exchangeexchanges in Europe as well as the U.S.), and LIBOR is now regulated by the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority. Manipulating LIBOR is now unequivocally a criminal offence. However, t. The nature of the inputs and the process of calculation have not been altered fundamentally, although one goal of the slimming down is to restrict LIBOR to currencies and tenors in which there are reasonable numbers of actual transactions against which LIBOR inputs can be compared.
LIBOR’s global role in financial derivatives has meant it could not easily be discarded. One bank’s head trader told Risk magazine in November 2012: ‘the [derivatives] contracts still exist. Anyone abolishing the fixing would be sued in a big way because that’s probably worse than having the rates manipulated, frankly.’ Another banker said: ‘I hate LIBOR—for many, many reasons—but we need it. It’s a consistent fudge factor that allows standardisaization in the industry.’ LIBOR rates are damaged global facts, but essential nonetheless.
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